

### Work it Out: Organizing Effective Adversary Emulation Exercises

@JorgeOrchilles
#PurpleTeamSummit

#### T1033 - System Owner/User Discovery

- 9+ years leading offensive team at Large Financial
- SANS Instructor & Author
- SEC564: Red Team Exercises and Adversary Emulation
- CVSSv3.1 Working Group Voting Member
- Author GFMA: Threat-Led Pen Test Framework
- Windows 7 Administrator's Reference (Syngress)
- South FL ISSA, Fellow, and Webinar Committee











#### Purple... how hard can it be?



#### Lock Red and Blue in the same room



#### How you think it will go



### How it may go



## Agenda (because #structuredlife)

- How did we get here?
- Goals
- Sponsors and Roles
- Framework/Methodology
- TTPs
- Infrastructure Setup
- Team Prep

- Kick Off
- Exercise Flow
- Wrap Up
- Show Value





Adversary Emulation: effort to reproduce how an adversary operates, following the same Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, to reach a similar objective

- Blind (Blue Team doesn't know of exercise)
  - Red Team Exercise || Threat-Led Penetration Test
- Non-Blind: Purple Team Exercise

#### Define: "In Person Purple Team Exercise"



'Hands on keyboard' engagement where:

- Red and Blue teams sit together
- Having an open discussion as one team
- While performing TTPs
- Review detective/preventive controls
- Perform live incident response
- Improve people, process, and technology



## Adversary Emulation Goals

- Emulate an end to end attack against a target organization
- Obtain a holistic view of target organization
- Measure people, process, and technology
- When to do In Person Purple Team?
  - Prior to a blind Adversary Emulation
  - After a blind Adversary Emulation as "Replay"
  - To train new team members
  - Periodic training for certain operational locations
  - To chain TTPs (Attack Patterns) that have previously been documented
- Continuous Purple Team
  - Test new TTPs based on Threat Intelligence



## We Need Sponsors aka \$\$\$

- Approve the exercise, scope, and budget
- 2-3 members of each team:
  - Red Team
  - SOC
  - Incident Response



### **Time Requirements**

- In-Person Purple Team Exercises can run for 1-5 days of mostly hands on keyboard work between Red Team and Blue Teams
- Preparation time is based on the defined goals, guidance or constraints set by Sponsors, and emulated adversary's TTPs

Preparation	Exercise	Action Items
4-8 weeks	1 week	Undefined

### Roles & Responsibilities

Title	Role	Responsibility
Head of Information Security	Sponsor	Approve Exercise and Budget
Red Team Manager	Sponsor & Attendee	Define Goals, Select Attendees, Select TTPs
SOC Manager	Sponsor & Attendee	Define Goals, Select Attendees, Select TTPs
Incident Response Manager	Sponsor	Define Goals, Select Attendees, Select TTPs
Threat Intelligence Analyst	Sponsor	Define Goals, Select TTPs
Red Teamers	1-3 Attendee(s)	Prepare, Attend, Action Items
SOC Analysts	2-5 Attendee(s)	Prepare, Attend, Action Items
Hunt Teamers	1-3 Attendee(s)	Prepare, Attend, Action Items
Incident Response Analysts	1-3 Attendee(s)	Prepare, Attend, Action Items
Exercise Coordinator	1-2	Operational Managers that lead Preparation Phase
		activities, participate in or observe the exercise, and
		responsible for the Lessons Learned document. Record
		minutes, notes, action items, and feedback. Send daily
		emails with those notes as well as plan for the next day.

## Framework & Methodology

- Cyber Kill Chain Lockheed Martin
- Unified Cyber Kill Chain Paul Pols
- Financial/Regulatory Frameworks
  - CBEST Intelligence Led Testing
  - Threat Intelligence-Based Ethical Red Teaming
  - Red Team: Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercises
  - Intelligence-led Cyber Attack Simulation Testing
  - A Framework for the Regulatory Use of Penetration Testing in the Financial Services Industry
- Testing Framework:






### Mandatory MITRE ATT&CK Slide

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction
Exploit Public- Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Compressed	Data Encrypted for Impact
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Defacement
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	AppInit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data Staged	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Data Transfer Size Limits	Disk Content Wipe
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	AppInit DLLs	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Information Repositories	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Clear Command History	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Local System	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Endpoint Denial of Service
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Firmware Corruption

#### Select TTPs

- Select TTPs at least 4 weeks in advance and based on goals
- TTPs chosen should be actively used by malicious actors targeting the organization




#### **ATT&CK Navigator**

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itial Access	Execution	Persistence
items	33 items	59 items
e-by promise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc
ploit Public-	CMSTP	Accessibility Feature
ing Application	Command-Line Interface	Account
ernal Remote vices	Compiled HTML File	Manipulation AppCert DLLs
rdware Additions	Control Panel Items	Applinit DLLs
plication rough	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application
movable Media	Execution through API	Shimming
earphishing achment	Execution through Module Load	Authentication Package
earphishing Link	Exploitation for Client	BITS Jobs
earphishing via	Execution	Bootkit
vice	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions
oply Chain mpromise	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association
sted ationship	Launchctl	Component Firmwa
d Accounts	Local Job Scheduling	Component Object Model Hijacking
	LSASS Driver	Create Account
	Mshta PowerShell	DLL Search Order
	Regsvcs/Regasm	Hijacking
	Regsvr32	Dylib Hijacking External Remote
	Rundll32	Services
	Scheduled Task	File System

https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/enterprise/

#### Extract TTPs from CTI



FireEye Threat Intel: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/12/overruled-containing-a-potentially-destructive-adversary.html

#### **Discuss TTPs**

- Identify controls expected for those TTPs and which teams should have visibility of TTP activity
- Create table showing expected outcomes per team:

Procedure	Technique	Tactic	Detection	SOC	Hunt	IR
<ttp1></ttp1>	<technique1></technique1>	<tactic1></tactic1>	<control1></control1>	Х	Х	Х
<ttp2></ttp2>	<technique2></technique2>	<tactic2></tactic2>	<control2></control2>	Х	Х	
<ttp3></ttp3>	<technique3></technique3>	<tactic3></tactic3>	<control3></control3>	Х		Х
<ttp4></ttp4>	<technique4></technique4>	<tactic4></tactic4>	<control4></control4>		Х	Х

#### Use VECTR

#### https://vectr.io/

VECT	R Dashboard	× +									
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$\rightarrow$	SAMPLE.	_MITRE	_ATTACK / N	1ITRE AT	TACK Q2 2018 / Full Asses	sment / Execution					
		New	Test Case								
*	Execut	ic	Status:		Red Team Details	¢	Blue Tea	ım Details		Detection Time 🛭 📽	
<u>~</u> *			NotPerformed		Name		Outcome				
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ý T											
			Attack Stop	¢\$	Attack Pattern	Phase	Tags 👒				
ş					Command	Execution	Rules				
			Source IPs	¢8	command		Preventio	on			
			References +			<i>li</i> ,	+				
							Detection				
					Attacker Tools 👒	Target Assets 🛛 🕫	+				

## Logistics

- Pick a physical location
  - SOC locations are ideal as SOC Analysts, Hunt Team, and Incident Response are generally physically present
- Obtain travel approval from sponsors
  - Plan to arrive a day early
- Training room or large conference room
- Each attendee should have workstation with media output to show current screen to other participants

### **Target Systems**

Provision production systems for exercise


- Endpoint Operation Systems in Environment
  - Windows 7 through 10 multiple hosts
  - Terminal Services/Citrix
- Server Operating Systems in Environment
  - Windows Servers
  - \*nix Servers

Consider VDI, virtual, and cloud servers

## Security Tools

Request the target systems have production security tools:

- Anti-Virus/Anti-Malware
- Anti-Exploit
- Endpoint Detection & Response
- Forensic Tools
  - Image acquisition
  - Live forensics



### **Target Accounts**

Service or secondary accounts should be created for logging into systems, accessing Internet, receiving email, etc. and to ensure real production credentials are not compromised

- Request secondary account of a standard user
- Request Standard Email Access
- Request Internet Access
- Add accounts as local administrator of some target systems

### Attack Infrastructure

- Choose and procure external hosting provider
- Create internal and Internet virtual machines
  - Only allow connection from organization proxies and Red Team IP addresses
  - Obtain and add external IP address of External Line of location of event
  - Build Credential theft site or Payload delivery sites
  - Setup C2 Infrastructure based on payloads and TTPs
- Ensure SMTP servers allow sending emails into organization
- Purchase Domains and TLS Certificates
- Provide IP addresses and Domains to SOC for whitelisting
- Ensure white listed on any Network Access Controls

## Red Team Prep

- Setup at least 2 laptops to show the attack activity live
- Ensure Attack Infrastructure is fully functional
- Ensure Target Systems are fully functional
- Document all commands required to emulate TTPs (Adversary Emulation Manual)
- Setup resource scripts/framework equivalent to generate payloads and setup handlers
- Test TTPs before exercise on different hosts than the exercise hosts but that are configured alike

## SOC/Hunt Team Prep

- Validate security tools are reporting to SOC production tools from the target systems
- Ensure C2 whitelist of the Red Team domains
- Ensure TLS decryption for the Red Team domains
- Verify whitelisting
- Work with Red Team during testing of payloads and C2 prior to exercise
- Ensure laptop or workstations have access to all tools for showing on large screen in exercise location @jorgeorchilles

### Incident Response Prep

- Create an IR case/id
  - This will allow tagging artifacts and following normal processes without flagging any suspicious activity e.g. pulling memory from a system that does not have a formal case
- Ensure the correct forensic tools are deployed on the target systems
- Install Live Forensic Tools for efficiency
  - Sysmon
  - Processmon

## Day of Exercise

- Exercise Coordinators should arrive early to ensure all systems are working:
  - Video conference
  - Presentation mode
  - External WiFi
  - Attack Infrastructure
  - Target Systems
- Purple Team Exercises should kick off in the afternoon in the event anyone is running late due to logistical issues

## Kick Off

- Sponsor kicks off the exercise
- Motivate the attendees
- Go over the flow of the exercise



#### **Exercise Flow**


- 1. Red Team presents the TTP and technical details
  - Attack Vector
  - Delivery Method
  - User Interaction
  - Privilege gained
  - Tool or exploit used
- 2. Purple Team discussion of controls based on delivery method
  - SOC: Any logs or alerts for this TTP
  - Hunt Team: Any Hunt Cases for this TTP
  - Incident Response: Documented methods to identify if TTP was leveraged

#### **Exercise Flow**

- 3. Red Team executes the TTP
  - Provides attacker IP address
  - Provides target
  - Provides exact time
  - Shows the attack on projector
- 4. SOC, Hunt, and IR follow process to identify evidence of TTP
  - Time must be monitored to meet expectation and move exercise along

#### **Measure Detection Maturity**

- 0. Emulation does not generate events
- 1. Emulation generates events locally
- 2. Emulation generates events centrally (no alert)
- 3. Emulation triggers an alert
- 4. Emulation triggers the response process



Cancel Save

#### **Exercise Flow**

- 5. Show on screen if TTP was identified, received logs, alert, or forensic data
  - Time to detect and/or time to receive alert
  - Red Team stops TTP
- 6. Document what worked and what did not
- 7. Is there any short term adjustments that can increase visibility?
  - Implement adjustment
  - Red Team re-runs TTP
- 8. Document any Action Items
- 9. Repeat flow for the next TTP


## Wrap Up

- At least one dedicated Exercise Coordinator should be on site to take minutes, notes, action items, and feedback
- Daily emails should be sent to all attendees and sponsors with minutes, action items, and plan for the next day
- The Exercise Coordinator is also responsible for the creation of a Lessons Learned document following each exercise
- A feedback request should be sent to all attendees on the last day of the Purple Team Exercise to obtain immediate feedback, while it is fresh on attendee's minds
- Lessons Learned documents should be completed and sent to Sponsors and Attendees less than 30 days after the exercise has concluded

#### How to show value?



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
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2017 Q1 Purple Team
2017 Q1 Purple Team
Assessments Aggregated
Test Cases Completed:
Test Cases Passed:
Detected:
Blocked:
Test Cases Failed:
Not Detected:
Test Cases Not Completed:
To Be Determined:




Campaigns with Most Success	
C2 Channels - Round 3	Superior (100.00%)
Windows Domain Enumeration	Superior (100.00%)
Network MiTM	Superior (100.00%)
Technical Defenses - Malicious Office Attachment	Superior (100.00%)
NAC Bypass	Superior (100.00%)
Campaigns with Least Success	
Campaigns with Least Success	
Campaigns with Least Success External Port Scans	Lower (0.00%)
	Lower (0.00%) Lower (0.00%)
External Port Scans	. ,
C2 Channels - Domain Fronting	Lower (0.00%)

#### Statistics by Kill Chain Phase


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Test case detection status distribution with respect to attack lifecycle phases



#### Statistics by Detection/Prevention Tool

Blocked and detected test cases for detection/prevention tools employed



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126

102

48

54

24

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
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


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No Test Co	verage	Outcome TBI	D	APT16		ADVSTORESHEL	L		Moderate	
				APT17		ASPXSpy				
Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privileg Escalatio	APT18		🗌 Agent Tesla		Collection	Command and Control	Exfi
Drive-by	AppleScript	.bash_profile	Access To	APT19		Agent.btz		udio Capture	Commonly 3	Autom
Compromise	CMSTP	and .bashrc	Manipulati	APT28		Astaroth		utomated	Used Port	Exfiltra
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Application	Line Interface	Account	AppCert Dl	APT3		Autolt backdoor		lipboard Data	Removable Media	Data
External Remote	Compiled HTML File	Manipulation	AppInit DLI	APT30		Azorult		formation	Connection	Encryp
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Hardware	ltems	AppInit DLLs	Shimming	□ APT33		BADCALL		ata from ocal System	Custom	Exfiltra
Additions Replication	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass Use Account	□ APT33		BADCALL BADNEWS		ata from	Command and Control	Over Alterna
	Execution	Authentication	Control	□ APT37		BBSRAT		etwork hared Drive	Protocol	Protoc
	through API	Package	DLL Search Order					ata from	Cryptographic	Exfiltra Over
Spearphishing	Execution through	BITS Jobs	Hijacking				Cancel Done	emovable	Protocol	Comm
Attachment	Module Load	Bootkit	Dylib Hijacku	Ig Delivery		Jocanning	Remote	ledia	Data Encoding	Contro Chann
Spearphishing	Exploitation	Browser Extensions	Exploitation	Compiled	Hooking	Network Share	Desktop Protocol	Data Staged	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltra
	for Client	Extensions	for Privilege	HTML File	Langet Orante	Discovery			- Suruscation	- Annu a

#### Statistics by Kill Chain Phase

Test case detection status distribution with respect to attack lifecycle phases

TECHNIQUES



Success Rates

#### CAMPAIGNS PHASES

Campaign Assessment Score Credential Access MITRE ATTACK Q2 2018 Superior (100.00%) Privilege Escalation MITRE ATTACK Q2 2018 Superior (95.24%) MITRE ATTACK Q2 2018 Execution Superior (90.48%) MITRE ATTACK Q2 2018 Persistence Superior (84.62%) MITRE ATTACK Q2 2018 Discovery Superior (83.33%) MITRE ATTACK Q2 2018 Collection Superior (80.00%) MITRE ATTACK Q2 2018 Defense Evasion Superior (80.00%) MITRE ATTACK Q2 2018 Exfiltration Above Average (75.00%) MITRE ATTACK 02 2018 Command & Control Above Average (72.22%)

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	TRE ATTACK Q2	2018 - ALL SE	LECTED -					Outcomes	ELECTED V Col	
Assessment Hea	atMap	<b>&gt;</b>								
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Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Replication 2 Through Removable Media	Command-Line	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery Application	AppleScript 2 Application	Automated	Automated Exfiltration	Communication Through Removable Med
/alid Accounts 3	Interface Dynamic Data	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Bypass User Account Control	Bash History Brute Force	Window Discovery Network Service	Deployment Software	Collection Clipboard Data	Data Compressed Data Encrypted	Connection Pro:
	Exchange Execution through	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs 2	Clear Command History	Credential Dumping	Scanning Network Sniffing	Distributed Component Object Model	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Alternative	Custom Comma and Control Protocol
	API Execution through	AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs 2	Application 2 Shimming	Component Firmware	Credentials in Files Forced	Permission Groups Discovery	Logon Scripts 2	Data from Network Shared Drive	Protocol Exfiltration Over	Custom Cryptographic
	Module Load Graphical User	Application 2 Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	Component Obj€2 Model Hijacking	Authentication	Process Discovery Query Registry	Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop	Data Staged Email Collection	Command and Control Channel	Protocol Data Encoding
	Interface InstallUtil 2	Authentication Package	DLL Search Ord€³ Hijacking	Deobfuscate/Deco de Files or Information	Input Capture Keychain	Remote System Discovery	Protocol Remote File Copy	Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscatio
	Launchctl 3 Local Job	Bootkit Browser 2	Exploitation for <b>4</b> Privilege Escalation	Disabling Security Tools	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning	Security Software Discovery	Remote Services Replication 2	Screen Capture Video Capture	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Domain Fronting Fallback Channe
	Scheduling LSASS Driver 2	Extensions Change Default File Association	Extra Window 2 Memory Injection	DLL Search Ord€ Hijacking	Network Sniffing Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Through Removable Media Shared Webroot		Scheduled Transfer	Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels
	Mshta 2 PowerShell	Component Firmware	File System Permissions	DLL Side-Loading Extra Window 2	Securityd Memory	System Network Connections	SSH Hijacking			Multiband
	Regsvcs/Regasr 2	Component Obie 2	Weakness	Memory Injection		Discovery	Taint Shared Content			Multilaver

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## Don't have a Red Team?

- "Breach and Attack Simulation" (BAS) Vendors

   Control Validation
  - Red Team Automation
- Augments the *people* part of the "Red Team"
- May be more cost effective

## Lots of tools and vendors

#### Free

- APTSimulator
- Atomic Red Team
- AutoTTP
- Blue Team Training Toolkit
- CALDERA
- InfectionMonkey
- DumpsterFire
- Invoke-Adversary
- NSA Unfetter
- Office 365 Attack Simulator
- Purple Team Automation
- Red Team Automation (RTA)
- Uber Metta


#### Commercial

- AttackIQ
- Cymulate
- SafeBreach
- SCYTHE
- Spirent CyberFlood
- Verodin
- vThreat
- XM-Cyber



# SYTHE

#### https://www.scythe.io/



THANK YOU FOR ATTENDING

#### Any Questions?



#### **PURPLE TEAM** SUMMIT & TRAINING

**Dallas, TX** Summit: Oct 21-22 Training: Oct 23-29

sans.org/PurpleTeamSummit